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The Internet of Things (IoT) is expected to comprise of over 20 billion devices
connected to the Internet by the year 2020, and support mission critical appli-
cations such as health care, road safety and emergency services to name a few.
This massive scale of IoT device deployment, heterogeneity of devices and appli-
cations, and the autonomous nature of the decision making process introduces
new security requirements and challenges. The devices must be securely boot-
strapped in to the network to provide secure inter–device communication and
also, the applications must be able to authenticate and authorize these devices
to provide the relevant services.
In today’s Internet, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is widely used to provide au-
thenticity, encryption and data integrity during network communication through
the use of digital certificates. This thesis investigates the key aspects for deploying
a PKI security solution in an IoT ecosystem, ranging from deploying certificates
on new devices (bootstrapping) to complete life cycle management of these cer-
tificates. We believe that the current PKI can be, with suitable enhancements,
used to provide the efficiency, scalability and flexibility needed for IoT security.
This thesis provides a survey of key aspects for deploying PKI security solution
in IoT ecosystem. We investigate different certificate management protocols and
motivate the applicability of enhanced security over transport (EST) protocol for
IoT PKI solution. In addition, we propose a PKI deployment model and the
bootstrap mechanism to bring up an IoT device and provision it with a digital
certificate. Furthermore, we provide a prototype implementation to demonstrate
certificate enrollment procedure with an EST server.
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Language: English
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Sakernas Internet (IoT) fo¨rva¨ntas best˚a av mer a¨n 20 miljarder enheter som
a¨r anslutna till Internet a˚r 2020, och sto¨dja verksamhetskritiska applikationer
s˚asom ha¨lsov˚ard, trafiksa¨kerhet och ra¨ddningstja¨nsten fo¨r att na¨mna n˚agra. Den-
na massiva omfattningen av sakernas enhet driftsa¨ttning, heterogenitet enheter
och applikationer, och den sja¨lvsta¨ndiga karakta¨ren av beslutsfattandet info¨rs
nya sa¨kerhetskrav och utmaningar. Produkterna skall vara sa¨kert stroppad in p˚a
na¨tet fo¨r att ge sa¨ker inter - enhet kommunikation och a¨ven m˚aste anso¨kningarna
kunna autentisera och auktorisera dessa enheter fo¨r att tillhandah˚alla de aktuella
tja¨nsterna.
I dagens Internet, a¨r Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) anva¨nds i stor ut-
stra¨ckning fo¨r att tillhandah˚alla a¨kthet, kryptering och dataintegritet un-
der na¨tverkskommunikation genom anva¨ndning av digitala certifikat. Denna
avhandling underso¨ker de viktigaste aspekterna fo¨r att distribuera en PKI
sa¨kerhetslo¨sning i ett sakernas ekosystem, fr˚an distribuera certifikat p˚a nya en-
heter (bootstrapping) fo¨r att slutfo¨ra livscykelhantering av dessa certifikat. Vi
anser att den nuvarande PKI kan vara, med la¨mpliga fo¨rba¨ttringar, som anva¨nds
fo¨r att ge effektivitet, skalbarhet och flexibilitet som kra¨vs fo¨r sakernas sa¨kerhet.
Denna avhandling ger en o¨versikt o¨ver de viktigaste aspekterna fo¨r distribution
PKI sa¨kerhetslo¨sning i sakernas ekosystem. Vi underso¨ker olika protokoll certifikat
fo¨rvaltning och motivera tilla¨mpligheten av fo¨rba¨ttrad sa¨kerhet o¨ver transporter
(EST) protokoll fo¨r sakernas Internet PKI-lo¨sning. Dessutom fo¨resl˚ar vi en PKI
distributionsmodell och bootstrap mekanism fo¨r att ta upp en sakernas internet
enheten och tillhandah˚allandet det med ett digitalt certifikat. Dessutom erbjuder
vi en implementering prototyp att visa certifikatregistreringsfo¨rfarande med en
EST-server.
Nyckelord: IoT, PKI, EST, bootstrapping
Spr˚ak: Engelska
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a growing network of embedded autonomous
devices or sensors with an IP address for Internet connectivity. The inter-
connected system between IoT and other Internet capable system promises
improved quality of life, increased efficiency and greater economic growth.
Gartner’s recent reports on IoT devices indicate that there are more than 3
billion IoT devices available in the smart environment at present and there
is a continuing interest in the market towards adoption of IoT devices. How-
ever, Cyber threats are prevalent against IoT deployments, the number of
attacks and tools available to potential attackers are becoming more efficient.
This rise in the number of connected devices has created a pressing demand
for robust security and authentication mechanisms. The thesis focuses on
establishing trust across connected devices in large scale IoT deployments.
1.1 Problem statement
The rise in the number of connected IoT devices has lead to increase in the
challenges to secure inter–device communication. Moreover, recent attacks
on IoT environments demonstrate a lack of generic security architecture in
operation of IoT devices. Public key infrastructures (PKI) is the trusted se-
curity framework which provides authenticity, encryption and data integrity
to secure current Internet. In this thesis, we answer the question “What are
the various aspects to deploy a flexible, scalable, efficient and trustworthy
PKI for IoT environment ?”. We investigate key aspects, challenges and the
importance of deploying a PKI security solution for IoT ecosystem both from
a theoretical and an engineering perspective.
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1.2 Motivation
The work done in this thesis is motivated by the following factors :
1. Certificate management protocols facilitate PKI operations such cer-
tificate enrollment and revocation, private key generation, key renewal
and update. It is worth investigating the various existing certificate
management protocols and choosing the suitable for IoT device de-
ployment scenario.
2. Cyber threats are prevalent against IoT deployment scenario leading
to disabling of system operation, economic loss and threat to privacy
of sensitive user data. It is worth reviewing security attacks on various
IoT deployment scenarios.
3. PKI is designed to provide secure communication between client–server
architecture of current Internet. It is important to understand differ-
ent challenges and aspects to adopt PKI solution for providing secure
communication in IoT deployment scenario.
4. Certificate management system employed for PKI in IoT deployments
should support billions of certificate operations. It is significant to
examine a scalable data structure solution to support certificate oper-
ations.
5. Certificate provisioning addresses identification of devices based on dig-
ital certificates. It is appropriate to investigate different aspects for
bootstrapping an IoT device to provision it with a digital certificate.
6. Compromised certificate authority (CA) can end–up issuing unautho-
rised SSL certificates. This way an attacker can impersonate a web
server and extract sensitive user data. It is worth studying how ex-
isting solutions can be used to introduce trustworthiness of CAs by
making CA operations transparent in a PKI deployment.
1.3 Contribution
This thesis provides a survey of the key aspects and the importance of de-
ploying a PKI security solution for IoT ecosystem. We examine various ex-
isting protocols and mechanisms for certificate management including SCEP,
EST, CMC and CMP. We propose the use of EST protocol for secure cer-
tificate provisioning of IoT devices. Further, we motivate the applicability
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of EST protocol for resource constrained environments. We identify various
challenges in deploying PKI solution for IoT environment. Furthermore, we
discuss various cyber attacks against IoT deployment scenario leading to dis-
abling of system operation, economic loss and threat to sensitive user data.
Moreover, we propose a PKI deployment model for IoT environment and the
bootstrap mechanism to bring up an IoT device and provision it with X.509
digital certificate which ensures device authenticity, data confidentiality and
integrity. In addition to the literature survey, we provide a proof-of-concept
implementation which demonstrates certificate enrollment procedure with an
EST server.
1.4 Structure of the Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 3 provides the back-
ground information about certificate management protocols including SCEP,
EST, CMC and CMP. We motivate the adoption of EST protocol for re-
source constrained environments. Chapter 4 provides details on different
IoT deployment scenarios and reviews recent attacks in IoT environments.
Furthermore, we investigate various challenges and aspects to be considered
in deploying PKI solution for IoT environment. Chapter 5 examines different
schemes for naming and identification of IoT devices. Chapter 6 gives neces-
sary details about merkle hash trees (MHT) which is a scalable data structure
solution to support certificate operations performed by a CA. Chapter 7 con-
tains our proposal for the bootstrap mechanism to bring up an IoT device
and provision it with digital certificate. Chapter 8 explores application layer
protocol used in resource–constrained environments. In addition, we demon-
strate a prototype implementation for certificate enrollment procedure with
an EST web–server. Chapter 9 discusses the feasibility of applying certificate
transparency to increase the trustworthiness of CA operations. Chapter 10
summarizes the thesis and provides concluding remarks.
Chapter 2
Background on Public Key In-
frastructure
PKI is a model wherein a set of roles, policies and procedures are needed
for the creation, management, storage and revocation of digital certificates
to facilitate public–key encryption [106]. The main purpose of PKI model
is to enable secure communication between different entities involved in net-
work activities. Some such activities are e–commerce, Internet banking and
secure electronic mail. PKI plays a critical role in secure communication
where password based authentication methods are not sufficient and a more
thorough procedure is required to confirm the identities of communication
parties and validation of information transferred over the network.
PKI is built on public key cryptography and digital certificates. It is
an arrangement which binds the public key with the identities of different
network entities such as a user, client machine or a server. The binding pro-
cedure is established with the help of a CA. CA is responsible for registration
and issuance of digital certificates for the requesting clients or network enti-
ties. This in–turn allows clients to learn the public keys of other clients and
hence, communicate securely.
To illustrate this, we assume there are two network entities Alice and Bob
who want to securely communicate with each other. The CA is considered
to be a trusted node which has a self-signed digital certificate. Furthermore,
digital certificate is a data structure which binds name with public key. In
this scenario, if Bob trusts a particular CA and has the public key of the CA
he can further securely know the public key of Alice. To achieve this Bob has
to obtain a digital certificate signed by the CA that certifies the public key
of Alice. In some scenarios, Bob may not be pre–configured with the public
key of CA that certified Alice’s public key, hence, Bob has to obtain a chain
of certificates. For example, Bob knows the public key of CA1 and hence
12
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Figure 2.1: Fields in a digital certificate.
trusts CA1. Alice’s public key is signed by CA3. CA3’s public key is signed
by CA2 and CA2’s public key is signed by CA1 [89]. Once Bob obtains this
chain of certificates from Alice he can trust the public key of Alice and start
secure communication with her.
Figure 2.1 depicts the fields and the values used in a digital certificate.
Every CA has a self-signed certificate, hence, the issuer and subject fields of
certificate have the same value which is the distinguished name of the CA.
Public key field has the public key of the CA and the certificate is signed
using the private key of the CA. Any client certificate issued by a CA has
the distinguished name of the client in the subject field and the issuer field
has CA’s distinguished name. The public key of the client is inserted in the
public key field and the certificate is signed with the private key of the CA.
2.1 Roles in PKI model
In a generic PKI model there are multiple entities involved. Below we de-
scribe different roles in a PKI model [30, 64]:
1. Certificate Authority (CA) : The CA is responsible for storing, issuing
and digitally signing the certificates.
2. Registration Authority (RA) : The RA is responsible for verifying the
identity of entities requesting a digital certificate from a CA. The RA
is responsible for forwarding the issuance request to the CA.
3. Central directory : A secure database or repository for storing and
indexing keys.
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4. Certificate Policy (CP) : A CP is a document stating different roles
and duties of a PKI. In case of X.509 digital certificates, a specific field
can be set to indicate associated CP [34]. This value indicates the
assurance level associated with a certificate. Hence, any relying party
can decide the level of trust to put in the certificate.
5. Certificate management system (CMS) : A CMS is used for perform-
ing tasks such as managing access to stored certificates and delivering
certificates to be further issued to the requester [74].
Chapter 3
Background on Certificate Man-
agement Protocols
PKI is widely used to authenticate the identity of end–points such as users,
devices and applications in the form of digital certificates. Digital certificates
are being increasingly deployed, X.509 certificates [36] serve as the basis for
authentication in the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standards such
as The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [52] and IKEv2 [60], Virtual Private
Networks (VPNs) [27] and Transport Layer Security Protocol (TLS) [38, 39,
41]. A CA needs a certificate issuance mechanism or a protocol for granting
X.509 certificates to the end–points. Such protocols fall under the category of
certificate management protocols. Through certificate management protocols
a PKI client can issue requests such as certificate issuance, certificate renewal,
certificate revocation, etc., to the CA. Moreover, the protocol enables PKI
client to request certificate revocation status information. However, this
functionality is also distinctly provided by mechanisms such as certificate
revocation lists (CRLs) [114] and online certificate status protocol (OSCP)
[82].
Through the efforts of IETF PKI X.509 working group two certificate
management protocols have been developed – Certificate Management Pro-
tocol (CMP) [98] and Certificate Management Messages over CMS (CMC)
[26]. Both the protocols offer essentially the same basic functionality de-
scribed in Section 3.2 and Section 3.3. However, CMP is more comprehen-
sive and widely deployed [15] of the two. Moreover, over the years Cisco
has developed two other protocols – Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol
(SCEP) [51] and Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) [90]. EST and
SCEP facilitate certificate provisioning and enrollment. SCEP is the evolu-
tion of enrollment protocol which is widely supported in both client and CA
implementations.
15
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Figure 3.1: Time-line showing certificate management and certificate enroll-
ment standards over the years.
Figure 3.1 shows the time–line for creation of the aforementioned stan-
dards.
3.1 SCEP
SCEP is a PKI communication protocol which utilizes PKCS#7 and PKCS#10
messages that are sent over Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP). It is the
most widely deployed protocol for certificate requests and CRL queries. How-
ever, the protocol does not support certain certificate management features
such as in-band certificate revocation transactions. To support more compre-
hensive functionality the IETF protocol suite provides two other certificate
management protocols – CMP and CMC. SCEP is not a formal standard
or RFC; it is a draft which has already expired and has been published as
historic. The protocol supports operations such as public key distribution
through CA and RA, certificate enrollment, certificate query and CRLquery
[51].
The SCEP draft defines the following entity types :
1. Requester : The requester is the client or end-point for SCEP message
exchange. It is allowed to submit SCEP messages for itself or on behalf
of peers. Before starting a PKI transaction, a requester is required to
have an appropriate RSA key pair. This key is used for signing the
SCEP pkiMessage to be sent to the server. SCEP message types are
based on PKCS#7 [59] and PKCS#10 [85]. Moreover, a requester must
locally configure the IP address or domain name of the CA server and
identity information to be used for authentication of the CA.
2. SCEP CA : A SCEP CA is responsible for signing the client certificates.
The issuer field of the certificate is set with the name of issuing CA.
Before any PKI transactions can begin, the SCEP CA server obtains
a CA certificate which can be self–signed or issued by a higher level
CA. This certificate is provided out–of–band to the SCEP requester.
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To authenticate the CA certificate the requester can use the fingerprint
information in the CA certificate which is obtained after sending a Get-
CACert message. The CA is responsible for answering the CRL queries
of the requester and must include CRLDistributionPoint information
in the certificates it issues. Moreover, the CA server must be a high–
availability service for answering CRL queries itself. The CA can also
make the certificates available through LDAP [103]. Furthermore, the
CA can also enforce policies on the client requests, reject client requests
and return previously created certificates for duplicate requests.
3. SCEP RA : SCEP RA server performs authorization and validation
checks for the SCEP requester on behalf of CA server. After receiv-
ing a GetCACert message from the requester, RA performs validation
checks on the request and forwards the certification requests to the CA.
Moreover, the RA certificate is also included in the response to Get-
CACert message indicating the existence of the RA to the requester.
Communication between RA and CA server can be carried out with
SCEP messages or other protocols such as CMC [26].
3.1.1 SCEP based certificate enrollment
The certificate enrollment request from the requester has to be authenticated
by the CA/RA server before a new certificate can be issued. The SCEP pro-
tocol uses public-key cryptography to associate public keys and the identity
of the requester. This prevents a man–in–the–middle attack and the data
between the requester and CA is secured. The communication is secured by
using SCEP secure message objects which specifies how PKCS#7 [59] is used
for encryption and signing the messages. To perform signing, the requester
uses a local certificate obtained from an alternate CA. The CA server may
accept or reject the request by looking up at the policy settings . Moreover,
the requester can also locally generate a self-signed certificate to perform
the signing operation. The SCEP draft does not support client authentica-
tion based on a self–signed certificate. Requester authentication can also be
performed by utilizing challengePassword attribute which is sent as part of
the enrollment request by the requester. This attribute has been specified
as part of PKCS#9 standard[86]. The challengePassword is a shared secret
distributed privately (only known to the requester) by the CA server. This
attribute uniquely associates an enrollment request with the requester [51].
Figure 3.2 demonstrates certificate enrollment by utilizing challengePass-
word attribute in SCEP. The SCEP CA server does not support certification
revocation requests from the requester. Certificate revocation requests can
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Figure 3.2: Messages exchanged during certificate enrollment in SCEP.
be performed using other certificate management protocols such as CMP and
CMC.
3.2 CMP
CMP is a PKI communication protocol used by end–entities to obtain X.509
digital certificates from the CA server. CMP request and response messages
are encoded in Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) using Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) method. CMP messages are generally encapsulated
over HTTP. Other possible means of transport to carry CMP messages are
transmission control protocol (TCP) or any connection-oriented transport
protocol such as a file over file transfer protocol (FTP) or secure copy (SCP)
and through e–mail using multipurpose internet mail extensions (MIME)
encoding standard. CMP uses application/pkixcmp as the content–type [61].
Through CMP, an end–point can communicate with the CA server to request,
revoke, suspend and resume digital certificates. Any number of RAs can be
present to mediate the request–response messages between the CA and the
end–point.
End–entity certificate request messages need to be authenticated to the
CA or RA server. This is know as end–entity message origin authentication.
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Figure 3.3: Message flow during a certificate request with CMP.
To achieve this the CA or the RA server issues the end–entity with a secret
known as initial authentication key and a reference value which is used to
identify the initial authentication key. Further, the initial authentication key
is used to protect relevant PKI messages [98].
Figure 3.3 demonstrates a scenario where an end–entity initiates a new
certificate request from the CA server. In this scenario, message authenti-
cation of the end–entity is required, key generation occurs at the end–entity
and a confirmation message is sent by the end–entity after the completion of
the transaction.
In case, the verification of confirmation message fails at RA or CA server,
the newly issued certificate is revoked immediately.
CMP supports the following PKI management functions [98]:
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1. Root CA Initialization : A new root CA produces a self–certificate with
the fingerprint. Further, using out–of–band means the end–entities
acquire the fingerprint securely and can verify the self–certificate of
the newly created root CA.
2. Root CA Key Update : This operations supports periodically updating
CA keys.
3. End Entity Initialization : To initialize end–entities two steps are nec-
essary. First, acquiring PKI information. Secondly, verifying public
key of root CA. Verification is performed out–of–band.
4. Subordinate CA Initialization : The initialization of a subordinate CA
is similar to end–entity initialization. However, the subordinate CAs
are also updated with the revocation lists.
5. CRL production : A newly set–up CA must periodically produce ver-
sions of each CRL.
6. PKI Information Request : This operation enables PKI entity (CA, RA
or an end–entity) to acquire all the information about current status
of a CA.
7. Cross Certification : To accomplish this operation the requester CA
becomes the subject of the cross–certificate and the responder CA be-
comes the issuer.
8. Certificate Request : After the end–entity is initialized, it requests the
CA for a certificate with a certification request (cr) message. The CA
responds back with a newly created certificate after authenticating the
end–entity.
9. Key Update : This operation enables an end–entity to request an up-
date for an expiring key pair. The end–entity can send update requests
to the CA to issue a new certificate for a new key pair or for the same
key pair. The CA returns the new certificate in a key update response
message.
10. Revocation operations : Scenarios such as certificate forging require
revocation of the forged certificate. In this case, an authorised entity
can send a revocation request to the CA server.
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3.3 CMC
CMC is a certificate management protocol which is based on the existing
cryptographic message syntax (CMS), PKCS#10 [58] and certificate request
message format (CRMF) [97] specifications. CMC introduces a way of per-
forming enrollment operations within a single round trip unlike CMP pro-
tocol. The protocol is designed such that the key generation occurs at the
end–entity. CMC supports all the mandatory algorithms cited by S/MIME
standard [91]. Moreover, CMC also supports operations such as transac-
tion management, replay detection through tokens, deferred and pending
responses to enrollment requests which requires external methods for issu-
ing a certificate. Transport mechanisms exercised within CMC specification
such as HTTP, FTP, SCP, e–mail or TCP are defined in [99]. Architecturally
CMC is similar to SCEP, however, the specification supports more options
and implements greater algorithmic agility. CMC defines message formats,
message control, and data structures for supporting wider range of certificate
management operations in comparison to certificate provisioning operations
supported by SCEP [26].
An enrollment transaction in CMC is generally completed within a single
round–trip. An end–entity sends a PKI enrollment request to the CA server
and obtains a PKI enrollment response from the CA. Some exceptional cases
such as delayed certificate issuance require more than one roud–trip time.
CMC protocol defines two types of PKI requests and responses which are
formed using PKCS#10 or CRMF structures [99]:
1. Simple PKI Request: This request if formed using the bare PKCS#10
structure.
2. Full PKI Request: This request consists of more than one PKCS#10 or
CRMF messages structures encapsulated in a CMS as part of PKIData.
The two types of PKI Responses are based on SignedData or Authenti-
catedData message structures :
1. Simple PKI Response: This response is a certs-only SignedData.
2. Full PKI Response: This response consists of content type PKIRe-
sponse wrapped in a SignedData message structure.
In CMC, RAs participate in the protocol by wrapping the end–entity PKI
requests in another layer of PKI request and forwarding the expanded request
to the CA server. Moreover, the CAs and RAs require the client to include
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a proof–of–identity with the certification request. In CMC, the proof–of–
identity is based on a shared secret between the client and CA/RA server.
The shared–secret is a series of tokens which can be generated separately
through a dedicated hardware device. The end–entity usually proves its
identity by transferring this token in plain text along with a string identifier.
Moreover, CMC also provides renewal and re–keying mechanisms. These
requests are similar to any certification request wherein the end–entity needs
to provide an identity proof such as existing certificates from another trusted
CA [26].
Both CMC and CMP provide similar basic functionality for management
of certificate life–cycle for PKI entities. CMP extensively reuses the existing
CMS code which enables faster and efficient implementation of the protocol.
CMP offers some additional functionality over CMP such as direct transfer
of trusted root CA certificates to the end-entity. In terms of maturity level,
deployment and interoperability CMP scores over CMC. Currently, CMP is
supported in most of the PKI/CA products, offers extensive industry–wide
interoperability and has been tested thoroughly in multi–vendor PKI envi-
ronments. Due to the lack of implementations, CMC has not gone through
extensive industry–wide testing and hence, will take more years to reach the
stability and interoperability status offered by CMP [15].
3.4 EST
EST is a new protocol developed by Cisco to facilitate the life–cycle man-
agement of digital certificates. EST uses PKCS#10 and CMS for generating
certificate requests and definitions. Moreover, the implementation is avail-
able as an open–source library developed by Cisco as libEST [21]. EST
utilizes Cisco’s Next Generation Encryption (NGE) by using Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) instead of RSA encryption supported in SCEP. NGE
provides high level of security and scalability through a set of algorithmic
suites for authenticated encryption, elliptic-curve based digital signatures
and key establishment, and cryptographic hashing. Both EST and SCEP
facilitate certificate provisioning with the aim to provide certificates to the
end points from a CA/RA server. However, these protocols do not aim at
solving certificate management issues. Certificate management is handled
separately through CMC and CMP [22].
Figure 3.4 depicts the protocol stack used by EST protocol for message
transfer.
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Figure 3.4: Protocol layers used with EST.
3.4.1 Operational Scenarios in EST
Prior to initiation of requests/response messages, the EST clients and server
are configured with information to support mutual authentication and au-
thorization. This information can be in the form of shared secrets, network
service names, trust anchor information, enrollment keys, etc,. Moreover,
based on the network management practices in an enterprise the client’s
might be pre–installed with trust anchors through an out–of–band secured
procedure.
Figure 3.5 shows the general client–server interaction flow. Below we
describe the operational scenarios with EST protocol in detail [90] :
1. Retrieving CA Certificates : Before performing any operation, the EST
client requests a copy of EST CA certificates from the EST server.
EST CA uses this certificate to sign objects that are being issued to
the EST client such as certificates and CRLs. In order to authenticate
and verify the authorization scope of the EST server the client can use
different options including implicit trust anchor database, previously
distributed trust anchor specific to the EST server, manual authenti-
cation performed by network administrator or a certificate–less TLS
authentication based on a shared–secret specific to the EST server.
2. Initial enrollment of the client : After the client has authenticated an
EST server, it can acquire a certificate by submitting an enrollment
request to the EST server. Further, the EST server authenticates and
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Figure 3.5: EST client and server interaction flow.
authorizes the EST client using different options such as TLS based
authentication using vendor installed client certificate, certificate is-
sued by other CAs or existing client certificate issued by the same EST
server. Moreover the EST server can also perform certificate–less TLS
authentication based on a shared–secret or HTTP–based authentica-
tion with username and password distributed out–of–band.
3. Certificate Signing Request (CSR) attribute request : An EST client
can query the EST server for additional attributes before sending an
enrollment request. These attributes are helpful in providing additional
descriptive information to the EST server and the client. Information
such as media access control (MAC) address of client interface, cryp-
tographic hash function and encryption algorithm to be used can be
obtained using a CSR request.
4. Re–issuance of client certificate : An EST client submits a re–enrollment
request to renew its existing certificate. To authenticate itself the client
can produce the existing certificate to the EST server or leverage any
of the methods used for authentication during initial enrollment.
5. Server Key Generation : With the EST protocol the client can request
the server to generate a key pair. The server is responsible for imple-
menting appropriate random number and key generation as per [44].
Moreover, a CA policy determines the archiving of client key pair which
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is sent to the client over a secure TLS session.
3.4.2 Comparison of EST with SCEP
EST is the recommended protocol for certificate provisioning over SCEP for
the following reasons [22]:
1. SCEP messages are sent over HTTP using pkiMessage. To secure the
pkiMessage, the messages are are enveloped in pkcsPKIEnvelope en-
velopes. However, EST employs Transport Layer Security (TLS) for
secure transport of certificates and messages. This way there is no need
to envelop the messages.
2. In case of SCEP, the certificate signing request (CSR) is authenticated
through a shared secret between the client and the CA. Since EST uses
TLS, the requester of a CSR is pre–authenticated and trusted, hence,
the CSR is always tied to the requester. The method employed in
SCEP introduces a security concern.
3. Within the PKI ecosystem, it is necessary to support automated cer-
tificate renewal and re-enrollment. The previous implementations of
SCEP did not deploy such messages, however, recently submitted drafts
of SCEP have added the support for automatic renewal and re–enrollment
of certificates. In case of EST, automated certificate renewal and re-
enrollment messages are built–in with the standard.
4. EST has also added server–side key generation through an enrollment
request by the requester. In case of SCEP only private key generation at
the client side is supported. Within resource constrained environments
or devices server–side key generation can be an important aspect as
they do not have enough entropy source and power for generation of a
random private key.
5. As a standard SCEP was formulated in 1990s and did not receive wide
community scrutiny during the development phase in IETF. EST was
developed as a standard with the joint efforts of vendors and stan-
dards community and has received wide community scrutiny through-
out the development phase. Moreover, Cisco has provided an open–
source implementation of EST standard which is useful for vendors
and researchers to experiment with.
6. EST supports CA rollover for refreshing trust anchors installed on the
EST clients. To accomplish CA rollover, EST uses three certificates
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during the transition period. Hence, all the PKI entities can be rolled to
the new CA without affecting communication between the PKI entities
involved. However, CA rollover with SCEP is less flexible and lacks
automation. SCEP does not have a transition period for CA rollover
instead it requires a flag day.
EST provides significant security improvements over SCEP in the follow-
ing ways :
1. With EST the certificate signing request is tied to a requester which is
authenticated with TLS. Hence, the certificate is rendered only to the
requesting entity. The requesting entity holds a private key or a user–
name and password. The user–name and password acts as a proof of
possession (PoP). By enforcing PoP, requesting entities or clients can
not forge a certificate for other clients. However, with SCEP a CSR
is authenticated using a shared secret between a client and CA. This
introduces a security vulnerability in real–world deployments. Any
client with an access to the shared secret can generate a CSR for other
clients. Moreover, the shared secret is not a onetime secret for each
client, hence, it further complicates the distribution of a shared secret.
2. Over the years, TLS protocol has been continuously improved and its
security has been proven. This ensures that EST messages are secured.
However, SCEP is tightly coupled with RSA to provide data protection
which introduces security concerns with technological advancements.
3. EST offers better cryptographic agility than SCEP by supporting ECC
as a secure cryptographic algorithm for encryption. ECC is computa-
tionally efficient and better suited to the needs of resource–constrained
environments. SCEP uses PKCS#7 methods based on RSA encryp-
tion.
3.4.3 Comparison of EST with CMC and CMP
CMC and CMP protocol support to certificate management including certifi-
cate enrollment, certificate status, certificate revocation, etc,. EST caters to
certificate provisioning, hence, it can be considered as a profile of CMC that
uses a secure mode of transport for key enrollment and renewal. In case of
CA certificate rollover, EST follows CMP standard. In brief, CMC and CMP
were defined as two standards with common goal within a short time frame
by IETF. However, both the standards have to failed to gather mainstream
acceptance as they are complicated to implement.
Below we briefly describe ways in which EST differs from CMC and CMP:
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1. To define the ways of processing control data CMC uses multiple wrap-
pings of CMS messages and Abstract Syntax Notation (ASN.1) struc-
tures. CMP incorporates enveloped message data for control data pro-
cessing. However, the messages in EST are simple and lightweight.
2. EST incorporates TLS for secure transmission of messages.
3. With an enrollment request a server–side key can be generated in EST
standard. Moreover, the private key for client can be securely trans-
ferred with TLS without the need of further encryption. This can be
a vital step in case of Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) or
low power devices which do not have enough entropy for generating a
random private key. Server–side key generation is not included in CMP
standard. Moreover, CMC does not address server–side key generation
operation.
4. EST supports the renewal of CA certificates by combining renewal
messages defined in CMP with the CMC specification. However, CMC
does not support the renewal of CA certificates.
3.4.4 Adoption of EST
SCEP has been supported as an industry wide standard in vendor products
for more than 15 years. It is included in many standards and all the CAs sup-
port it. However, the limitations of SCEP are distinguishable with resource
constrained devices as described in the Section 3.4.2. CMP has been made
mandatory by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) as part of TS
33.310 standard. However, as a part of TS 33.310 standard the utilization
of CMP is limited to provisioning. Moreover, CMP is also included in the
National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Special Publication
800-57. Further, CMP and CMC are also supported by some of the CA ven-
dors and PKI products. The latest EST standard is used in IETF ANIMA
WG‘s bootstrapping drafts. Moreover, Wi–Fi alliance has mandated the use
of EST in hot–spot 2.0. Additionally, to address security concerns within
power systems the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) created
IEC 62351. IEC also mandates the use of EST as a certificate provisioning
protocol. Currently, multiple CA vendors are adding support for EST such
as Cisco‘s IOS and IOS-XE product [22].
Amongst the available protocols for certificate provisioning EST stands
out for its simplicity, open–source development and advantages it provides
over the other protocols. The open–source implementation in the form of a
portable library is easy to use and promotes quicker adoption and increases
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interoperability of EST into more vendor products. As per Industry Trade
Association for Public Services Networks (PSN), “Cisco’s release of its EST
code into the open source community will facilitate rapid adoption by the
PSN community. With the release of this code, other vendors will be able
to accelerate their adoption of EST and this in turn expands the choice of
encryption solutions available to public sector organizations” [16].
3.4.5 Potential Use Cases of EST
EST can be effectively deployed in a variety of use–case scenarios. One such
scenario can be an enterprise with numerous network end–points which re-
quire periodic certificate renewal. In case of enterprise server’s certificate
expiration, EST offers automatic re–enrollment for obtaining new certificate.
Subsequently, speeding up the entire procedure and this requires no manual
intervention from network administrator. Moreover, EST also supports auto-
matic redistribution of updated CA certificates. The future IoT environment
is bound to support large number of end–points giving rise to highly complex
certificate management issues. EST improvements can prove valuable and
important in such IoT deployment scenarios. We will discuss in detail the
deployment scenarios in Chapter 4.
TLS protocol has seen a lot of attacks including server–side certificate
forging leading to server impersonation and discovery of bugs in the protocol
such as SLOTH [32], Heartbleed [43, 75], BREACH [49], etc,. Such attacks
set the enterprises, consumers and organization into panic to determine an
immediate and appropriate solution which generally requires replacement
of server certificates. Re–enrollment capabilities of EST will support rapid
resolution of such security vulnerabilities.
Chapter 4
Security in IoT devices
IoT refers to the currently growing network of smart devices and sensors
with an IP address for Internet connectivity, and the communication occur-
ring between these smart devices and other Internet–capable devices and
systems. IoT devices share information and perform actions based on user
input or an automated controlling system to interact with other Internet–
capable devices and systems. This interconnected system between IoT and
other Internet–capable system promises improved quality of life, increased
efficiency and greater economic growth. Moreover, IoT offers advanced con-
nectivity between devices, systems and applications and introduces new pro-
tocols, specifications and applications [24].
4.1 Internet of Things market potential
Gartner’s recent reports on IoT devices indicate that there are more than 3
billion IoT devices available in the smart environment at present and there is
a continuing interest in the market towards adoption of IoT devices, with de-
ployments planned on a global scale [23]. Currently, the use of IoT devices is
widespread in manufacturing sectors seeking for automation, operational ef-
ficiency and resource optimization benefits [19]. However, there is a boom in
the number of small–scale innovative vendors focusing on categories such as
smart–connected homes, smart machines, semiconductors and IoT device se-
curity [17]. Core issues such as choosing the relevant platform and database,
applying appropriate cloud services and analytics, and managing the secu-
rity of IoT devices, need to be addressed to help foster the adoption of IoT
devices in future [20].
Figure 4.1 demonstrates a simplified IoT network architecture. IoT ap-
plications runs as a web application on a dedicated cloud server. The server
29
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Figure 4.1: Simplified IoT system architecture.
collects device data which is fed to data analytics module to draw conclusion
suited to the requirements of enterprise deploying the architecture.
4.1.1 Deployment Scenarios with IoT
A number of different markets are integrating IoT devices into their in-
frastructure and processes. IoT devices are fostering automation in fields
including automotive, health–care, smart–cities, transportation and indus-
tries catering to daily utilities for reducing cost and increasing energy ef-
ficiency. Commercially available IoT devices such as smart meters, solar
panels, etc, cater to aforesaid requirements. Moreover, IoT devices such as
heart–monitoring devices, wireless insulin pumps, sensors for automobiles,
smart–home appliances are also enabling development of advanced applica-
tions for daily use.
4.1.1.1 Automotive
Connected vehicle technology is an ecosystem of smart–cars, trucks or buses
embedded with IoT devices or internal sensors to determine accurate speed,
location and temperature of the vehicle. Moreover, this ecosystem is aimed at
enabling interaction between smart–vehicles with surrounding roads, build-
ings, pedestrians and other smart–vehicles in order to improve road safety,
reduce maintenance and insurance costs and avoid traffic congestion scenar-
ios.
Figure 4.2 demonstrates the architecture for IoT applications in connected
vehicular technology deployment scenario.
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Figure 4.2: Automotive deployment scenario with Smart vehicular technol-
ogy.
4.1.1.2 Health–care
IoT holds an immense potential to transform health–care into Internet of
Health–care Things. Connected IoT devices can be used to continuously mon-
itor patients with chronic conditions such as diabetes, heart–risks, etc,. to
tackle emergency situations, avoid hospitalization and handle pre–hospitalization
patient report generation to improve quality of life and reduce cost of care
for patients with chronic diseases. Moreover, personalised IoT devices can
minimize patient–doctor interaction by continuously recording, reporting and
triggering emergency alarms generated over health data based on daily ac-
tivities.
Figure 4.3 demonstrates the architecture for IoT applications in health–
care.
4.1.1.3 Smart–cities
Smart city is a vision of interconnecting public spaces and infrastructure
in urban cities through embedded sensors such as IoT devices. Smart city
caters to market segments such energy, transportation, health–care, build-
ings, infrastructure and governance. This concept has driven innovation and
experimentation with IoT technology into adaptive traffic monitoring and
controlling, self-driven cars, smart–home meters, monitoring environmental
changes, resource management within a city, smart–home controllers and
security systems, energy management and security solutions in office infras-
tructure, improving workplace productivity, etc,. Some quick use cases where
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Figure 4.3: Deployment scenario with Internet of Health–care Things.
the aforementioned technology helps include adjustment in travel schedules
of commuters based on real–time tracking of public transportation, improv-
ing air and water quality based on data provided through environmental
monitoring, reducing electricity loss during distribution with smart–meters,
etc, [78].
Figure 4.4 demonstrates the architecture for deployment of IoT applica-
tions in a smart–city.
4.1.1.4 Intelligent Transportation Systems
Intelligent transportation systems are fostering the adoption of IoT devices
and embedded sensors in vehicles such as cars, trucks, ships, air–crafts and
passenger trains. Moreover, IoT devices are permeating into transport in-
frastructure such as roadways, tunnels, bridges and railway tracks. This
widespread deployment will lead to vehicle, passenger and pedestrian safety,
increasing fuel efficiency, monitoring environmental pollution, routing of lo-
gistics transport, efficient selection of parking space and reducing road con-
gestion [28].
Figure 4.5 demonstrates the architecture for deployment of IoT applica-
tions in intelligent transportation systems.
4.1.1.5 IoT utilities
IoT devices are increasingly becoming an important part of the utility indus-
try with focus on improving energy efficiency, conserving energy and water
CHAPTER 4. SECURITY IN IOT DEVICES 33
Figure 4.4: IoT deployment scenario in Smart–cities.
Figure 4.5: IoT deployment scenario in transportation.
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Figure 4.6: IoT deployment scenario in Smart–Home utilities.
resources, improving home safety and security, automation of daily house-
work and reducing carbon emissions. This has led to adoption of devices such
as smart–grids, smart–meters, smart–home appliances to enhance interaction
between product, product owners and product manufacturers [29].
Figure 4.6 demonstrates the architecture for deployment of IoT applica-
tions in Smart–Home utilities.
4.1.2 Impact of various IoT applications
McKinsey estimates that IoT has a potential economic impact of 3.9 trillion
to 11.1 trillion dollars per year by 2025. These estimates are proposed consid-
ering factors such as IoT adoption rates, economic growth and demographic
trends [78].
As shown in Figure A.6, IoT applications catering to manufacturing fac-
tories will have the greatest impact equalling to approximate $3.7 trillion per
year. Moreover, smart–cities are the next largest IoT application deployment
scenario with a potential impact of $1.7 trillion per year by 2025. Figure A.6
also demonstrates major applications that will be deployed for the specific
IoT settings.
4.2 Security Attacks in IoT ecosystem
The rise of connected devices in IoT ecosystem has created a pressing de-
mand for robust security mechanisms [56, 76]. The number of attacks and the
tools available to potential attackers is becoming more efficient and effective
as the IoT ecosystem grows [65, 100]. Moreover, Cyber threats are prevalent
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against IoT deployment scenarios leading to disabling of system operation,
economic loss and privacy threat to sensitive user data [33, 95]. Such secu-
rity issues can hamper the deployment of IoT services and applications [48].
Moreover, hackers and attackers are showing increasing interest in exploiting
the security vulnerabilities in this area [45, 107]. Hence, security and privacy
are a serious concern for both device owners and manufacturers in the shift
towards IoT [25, 77].
Below we list some such security attacks on various IoT deployment sce-
narios :
1. In 2012, a series of hacks were perpetrated against smart–meter instal-
lations in Puerto Rico costing hundreds of millions of dollars annually.
The law enforcement agency expected similar threats to spread across
the country as more utilities deploy smart grid technology [87].
2. In 2012, Justin W. Clarke, a security researcher from San Francisco
Bay area, publicly disclosed a flaw in hardened grid and router provider
RuggedCom’s switches. By accessing the private key stored in Rugged
operating system, the attacker can successfully decrypt all the traffic
sent to or from the switch. This can further lead to compromise of the
entire energy grid [102].
3. Within a positive train control (PTC) system, the level of automation
and control also exposes the system to dangerous vulnerabilities. In
case, a malicious user gains system–level access, it is free to execute
any set of commands to trigger unwanted automated chain of actions
[18]. One such incident was reported in Poland, wherein a 14–year
old hacker changed the points on the city’s tram system leading to
derailment and injuring 12 passengers [35].
4. In 2014, Scott Erven and his team of security researchers released their
study on the vulnerability of medical devices. The study reveals that
drug infusion pumps can be remotely manipulated, X–rays can be ac-
cessed by attackers on hospital’s network, attackers can take down crit-
ical equipment during emergency situations and reset the configuration
of testing equipment [109].
5. In the recent past, cyber attacks have been launched against public
utility infrastructure such as power systems and water treatment plants
to affect the distribution of water and electricity [66].
6. In early 2015, a German steel mill was attacked by hackers leading to
massive physical damage. The hackers managed to manipulate and
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disrupt the control systems such that the blast furnace could not shut
down properly [110].
7. In 2015, two well known hackers Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek re-
motely compromised Jeep Cherokee and gained complete physical con-
trol over the vehicle. Prior to this, their research on vulnerabilities in
connected cars lead them to hacking Toyota Prius and a Ford Escape
by plugging a laptop into the vehicle’s diagnostic port allowing them
to control headlights, steering and brakes [80].
8. In 2015, Samsung shipped a smart–fridge with a significant security
flaw that can allow an attacker to gain access to login credential of
the user. The application level implementation does not validate SSL
server’s certificates [112].
9. In 2015, Marc Rogers and Kevin Mahaffey, demonstrated vulnerabil-
ities found in Tesla Model S that can allow an attacker to start the
vehicle by connecting a laptop to the car’s network cable. Moreover,
the security researchers could also plant a remote-access trojan on the
car’s internal network which allowed them to remotely control the car
[111].
10. In 2015, several vulnerabilities were disclosed in Hello Barbie, an iconic
toy which enables children to communicate with the doll over a cloud
server connection. The vulnerability allows an attacker to intercept
and spoof the audio communication between the toy and children [88].
4.3 PKI as a security solution for IoT
The rise in the number of connected IoT devices has lead to increase in the
challenges to secure inter–device communication. The IoT ecosystem requires
proven, reliable and tested network security solutions for data confidentiality,
data integrity, device authentication and device authorization. However,
recent attacks on various IoT deployment scenarios as discussed in Section 4.2
demonstrate a lack of generic security architecture or standard in deployment
and operation of IoT devices [73, 113].
From IoT ecosystem perspective, communications occur between the IoT
devices or between IoT devices and cloud server. Data confidentiality and
integrity are concerned with securing this data exchange against interception,
interruption and modification. Moreover, authentication and authorization
provide assurance that an IoT device is an entity it claims to be and the
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IoT device is authorized to perform a particular action. As a security so-
lution PKI provides and manages digital certificates which bind a public
key to an IoT device identity or private key such that any other entity in
the environment can validate this binding [101]. Currently, digital certifi-
cates used for identity management are based on X.509 certificates which
are self–descriptive entities specified using ASN.1. X.509 certificates are en-
coded using DER standards and are stored as an ASCII string using BASE64
encoding [36].
4.3.1 Security protocols in IoT protocol stack
With TCP/IP protocol stack, secure Internet communication is provided
through 3 key components :
1. Network protocols such as IPsec and TLS provide authentication and
data confidentiality at network and application layer for peer–to–peer
communication [40, 62].
2. Digital certificates provide a valid identity to each peer in the network.
3. PKI infrastructure supports the provisioning, management and revo-
cation of the digital certificates.
This three component based security solution can further be applied to
IoT networks. As shown in Figure 4.7 IoT protocol stack at network layer is
based on IPv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN)
[53]. Hence, network layer secure communication can be provided through
IPsec. Moreover, IoT uses Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) to
secure application layer data. DTLS protocol is based on TLS and provides
equivalent security to secure peer–to–peer communications [93]. In addition,
IoT protocol stack has been optimized for low power devices and hence the
data overhead generated through the stack is much smaller in comparison to
the TCP/IP protocol stack [63].
4.3.2 PKI consideration for IoT
PKI is designed to provide secure communication between Internet–based
client–server architecture. There are various challenges to be considered prior
to adopting PKI to provide secure communication in IoT deployment scenario
:
1. Peer authentication in IoT : In IP networks device authentication and
secure communication for application layer data is done with TLS pro-
tocol. TLS uses X.509 certificates during initial authentication phase
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Figure 4.7: Comparison of IoT protocol stack with TCP/IP protocol stack.
between two peers to negotiate the session key. Moreover, only server
presents a X.509 certificate to authenticate its identity with the client.
It is optional for the client to present X.509 certificate during the initial
authenticate phase. In case of IoT deployment scenario, it is necessary
to configure TLS to provide client’s X.509 certificate for mutual authen-
tication between communicating IoT devices or between IoT device and
the cloud server.
2. Key Generation : IoT devices are resource constrained devices and may
not have enough entropy to generate random private key. Therefore,
it is preferable to generate the private key at the CA/RA server. EST
certificate management protocol supports generation of client keys at
CA server and further secure transportation of the key over TLS and
DTLS. Moreover, the PKI solution should consider whether the key
should be completely removed to maintain the integrity of generated
certificates or securely store them through RA/CA server for revocation
or renewal cases.
3. Choice of Cryptographic Algorithm: As shown in Figure 4.7, DTLS is
the proposed protocol for securing device authentication and communi-
cation for application layer data. Using asymmetric encryption based
on RSA and PKI certificates, imposes high energy consumption in the
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IoT deployment scenario. In consequence, ECC is a better suited ap-
proach for IoT deployment scenario in comparison to RSA as it is more
energy efficient and offers same level of security with lesser key size
[50]. Moreover, EST offers CA side support for generation of private
keys based on ECC algorithm. Hence, EST can be used as the protocol
for certificate management in PKI security solution for IoT deployment
scenario.
4. Scalable Database Solution : PKI security solution should be effective
in scaling for different IoT deployment scenarios. IoT devices can be
deployed within a home or a building or over an entire city. Hence, there
is a need for an efficient and scalable database management system for
storing certificates that cater to different scale of IoT devices ranging
from thousands to millions to billions.
5. Life–Span of Digital Certificates : The lifetime of a digital certificate
may vary based on the type of IoT device, device manufacturer and IoT
deployment scenario. Some situations may warrant that certificates
and private keys can never be updated or replaced because they are
permanently stored on the device. However, some other scenarios for
IoT deployment may demand storing short–lived certificate on the IoT
device. In such situation handling revocation or renewal at a high scale
has to be considered in the design of the PKI solution.
6. Certificate Management Protocol : Currently, various certificate man-
agement protocol such as SCEP, CMC and EST, exist for supporting
secure certificate provisioning. It is necessary to consider advantages
and disadvantages of each before choosing the suitable one for PKI
solution.
7. Managing High–Volume Issuance : Irrespective of deployment scenario,
every IoT device will be installed with a vendor certificate during man-
ufacturing. This requirement necessitates a highly available, fault-
tolerant and scalable CA server.
8. Number of certificates per device : Depending on the deployment sce-
nario the number certificates installed on the device may vary. For
example, a smart vehicle will not only need a pre–installed vendor cer-
tificate but an operator certificate and other necessary certificates in
order to communicate with entities such as other smart–vehicles, trans-
portation infrastructure (traffic lights), etc., while on the move.
Chapter 5
Naming of IoT Devices
To support large scale deployment of IoT devices, naming and identi-
fication of the device is a pre–requisite. However, it is impossible to
assign names to IoT devices from a single name–space considering the
number of devices deployed will reach to billions. Naming of the IoT
devices can be either hierarchical or flat. Hierarchical names cater to
scalable name assignment and resolution while flat names, generated
based on unique identifier such as MAC address, work as a self–certified
IDs [57].
5.1 DNS name auto–configuration for IoT
devices
Currently, network devices support automatic configuration of IPv6
address using neighbour discovery [84], default gateway configuration
by employing IPv6 stateless address auto–configuration [105] and DNS
server configuration with IPv6 router advertisement (RA) options for
DNS configuration [54]. However, DNS names have to be configured
manually and will prove to be cumbersome in IoT deployment sce-
nario considering the growing scale of deployed devices. For our scal-
able and flexible PKI solution we will consider the auto–configuration
scheme of DNS names [55]. The auto–configuration scheme generates
a DNS name at the host, assisting easy monitoring and remote con-
trolling of IoT devices [72]. This scheme works in unicast mode as
opposed to multicast mode used in bonjour application [1] and hence,
generates less network traffic. To generate the DNS name, the auto–
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Figure 5.1: Message flow to demonstrate auto–generation of DNS name.
configuration mechanism needs to acquire the DNS search list (DNSSL)
either through RA options [54] or via dynamic host configuration pro-
tocol version 6 (DHCPv6) options [42]. DNSSL is a list of DNS suffix
domain names that are used by IPv6 hosts.
The auto–generated DNS name is of the format unique id.device model.
device category.location.domain name. unique id is a unique identifier
in ASCII characters. It can be a sequence of numbers or set of al-
phanumeric characters. device model is the model name for the device
in ASCII characters provided by manufacturer. device category is the
category to which the device belongs such as refrigerator, smart–tv,
smart–meter, etc,. location represents the physical location of the de-
vice. domain name is the DNS domain name such as example.com or
aalto.com [55].
The procedure for DNS name auto–configuration is completed in two
phases. In the first phase, the IoT device generates it own DNS name
and in the second phase the generated name is registered with the DNS
server [72].
Figure 5.1 shows the first phase in DNS name auto–configuration. In
this phase, the IoT device gets the DNSSL list through either RA or
DHCPv6 options. It performs validity check on the DNSSL option
received. If it is valid, then the IPv6 host or IoT device generates the
unique DNS name after performing duplicate address detection (DAD).
Figure 5.2 shows the second phase in DNS name auto–configuration.
In this phase, an IoT device receives a node information (NI) [37] query
from the router in the same sub–net. It sends the NI response with the
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Figure 5.2: Message flow to demonstrate DNS name registration.
generated DNS name. The router then registers the DNS information
with the DNS server through dynamic DNS update [108].
Chapter 6
Certificate Management with
Merkle Hash Trees
Certificate management system maintained by the CA server supports
insertion, deletion and searching of digital certificates. Our proposed
PKI solution uses merkle hash tree data structure based on authenti-
cated dictionary called as AD–MHT [81, 83] for supporting the afore-
mentioned operations. Identity certificates are used to bind a pub-
lic key with an identity. It is an association between a distinguished
name (DN) and the requesting entity’s public key. It is necessary that
each requesting entity posses a unique DN. Moreover, X.509 standard
defines the data and data format for identity certificates. The data
fields in X.509 certificates include version, serial number, signature
algorithm identifier, issuer name, validity period, subject name and
subject public–key information. Serial number is generated by the CA
and is used to uniquely identify a certificate. Issuer name is the DN of
the issuing entity. Subject name is the DN of the entity requesting a
certificate. Moreover, validity period defines the expiration time of the
certificate. The certificate has to be revoked once it is expired.
PKI handles the management of certificates during the entire lifetime.
With certificate revocation an issuer can revoke the binding between the
identity and the public key before the certificate expires. Certificate
revocation is needed in case of loss or compromise of private keys,
change of access rights of the certificate owner, policy changes at CA
or as a precautionary measure against certificate forging attacks [47].
Figure 6.1 demonstrates the certificate revocation mechanism. In order
to revoke a certificate the issuer initiates the revocation process and
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Figure 6.1: CA reference model for certificate revocation [81].
sends a revocation request to the revocation data issuer (RDI). RDI
has the access to the database of the revoked certificates and is also
responsible for maintaining an appropriate status data format for the
revoked certificates that can be distributed to the end–entities [81].
CMP is one of the protocol that can be used for communication in
revocation reference model. Moreover, the end–entities can use CRL
for status checking. CRL is digitally signed by the CA and includes
information such as certificate serial number, revocation reason and
revocation date [36].
6.1 Merkle Hash Tree
MHT stores data only in the leaves of the tree. The contents of the leaf
nodes are hashed and combined to generate nodes for the upper level
of the tree. This process is recursively applied to generate the root
node of the tree which is digitally signed by the CA to authenticate the
entire MHT [81].
Figure 6.2 shows a sample MHT. MHT employs properties of one way
hash functions (OWHF). OWHFs are 10,000 times faster to compute
than digital signatures. Ni,j denotes a node in MHT where i represents
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Figure 6.2: An example of MHT [81].
the depth or the level of the node and j represents the number of the
node. Moreover, Hi,j is the hash value stored by the node Ni,j. The
nodes at level 0 are called leaf nodes and they store the data in the
tree. The data stored is represented by the set φ[79].
φ = {c0, c1, c2.....cn}
where cj is the data stored by leaf node N0,j. Hence, H0,j can be computed
as :
H0,j = h(cj)
where h is the OWHF. In order to construct a MHT, a set of t adjacent nodes
at level i; Ni,j, Ni,j+1, ..., Ni,j+t−1 are concatenated to create the node for
upper level which is denoted byNi+1,k. Hence, Hi+1,k is obtained by applying
h or OWHF to the concatenation which is denoted by the equation as :
Hi+1,k = h(Hi,j|Hi,j+1|...|Hi,j+t−1)
The root node at the top level is a digest for all the data stored in the
MHT. MHT shown in Figure 6.2 is a binary tree with the adjacent nodes
combining in pairs to form the node in the next level. MHT–AD is a 2–3 tree
structure where each internal node has two or three children. For a MHT–AD
with n leaves, certificate management operations such as insertion, deletion
and search can be performed in O(log(n)) time. Each leaf in the MHT-AD
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represents a certificate. The leaves are ordered by the serial number of the
certificate [79].
6.2 Certificate Transparency
Over the past years there have been numerous incidents where an attacker
was able to compromise the private keys of intermediate CA or the root CA.
This lead to issuance of unauthorised SSL certificates for domains owned
by Google, Facebook, Yahoo and Microsoft. This way the attacker could
impersonate a web server or act as a man-in-the-middle to get critical user
information like user–name, password, bank details, download malware on
victim’s machine etc. In some cases, attacks are being carried out by en-
terprises to monitor employees or by government agencies for surveillance
purposes. Below, we list some of the detected forged SSL certificate attacks
:
(a) In March, 2011 Comodo Inc. experienced a major security com-
promise and issued 9 fraudulent digital certificates for domains
such as Google, Yahoo and Skype [94]. Attacker was successful in
obtaining user–name and password of Comodo’s RA in Southern
Europe and issue the forged certificates. RA are subordinate to
CA and perform the task of authenticating the identities of certifi-
cate requesting entities. The attacker falsely attested the authen-
ticity of the parties requesting the certificate using the stolen RA
log–in information. The attacker’s IP address was traced back to
Iran. It was purported that the attack was carried out for political
motives.
(b) In 2011, an attacker successfully took control of 8 certificate–
issuing servers of Dutch CA DigiNotar [46]. The attacker was
successful in obtaining wild card certificates for *.google.com and
other domains such as Yahoo and Mozilla. It was purported
that the attack was aimed at launching a large–scale man–in–
the–middle attack against Internet users in Iran. This attack led
to bankruptcy of Dutch CA DigiNotar.
(c) In early December, 2013 Google reported an unauthorized digital
certificate issued by an intermediate CA [69]. The forged digital
certificate was linked back to the French CA ANSSI. The certifi-
cate was used to monitor traffic on a private network.
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(d) In late December, 2013 Google again reported an unauthorized
wild card digital certificate issued by an intermediate CA [68].
The forged digital certificate was linked back to TURKTRUST,
a Turkish CA. It was revealed by TURKTRUST that way back
in August 2011, they had issued 2 intermediate certificates to an
organization mistakenly.
Certificate Transparency proposed by Google aims at solving the aforemen-
tioned certificate–based threats by making CA operations such as issuance,
revocation, renewal, etc,. on SSL certificates open to scrutiny by domain
owners, CAs and domain users through certificate logs, monitors and audi-
tors. Certificate transparency intends to bring public scrutiny and openness
to the current PKI model. It supports early detection and faster mitigation
of forged certificates, rogue CAs and offers a better oversight of the current
PKI model [3].
Figure 6.3: Certificate Transparency system architecture[70].
Certificate logs are at core of the architecture shown in Figure 6.3. Cer-
tificate logs are append–only and are assured using MHT proof–of–presence
mechanism. By using the cryptographic hash the logs are tamper–proof, in-
corruptible and it makes possible to detect forged forks in the logs or outdated
certificate insertion with the help of auditors. Moreover, each certificate log is
publicly advertised with a URL and public key. End–points can use HTTPS
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GET and POST messages to interact with the log server. When a CA sub-
mits valid certificate to the log, the log server responds back with a signed
certificate timestamp (SCT). SCT is associated with a certificate throughout
the lifetime and the TLS server attaches this value with the certificate during
initial handshake phase [71].
Monitors are used to oversee the operation of the log server and watch the
logs for forge certificates, unusual certificate extensions, certificates with false
permissions, etc,. Monitors periodically fetch new entries in the log server to
verify that they are publicly visible. Moreover, monitors maintain complete
copy of the log server and can be used as a read–only back–up service when
log server goes oﬄine. Auditors verify the integrity of logs by periodically
fetching and checking whether a particular certificate exists in the log.
Certificate transparency uses signed cryptographic hashes of MHT as log–
proofs to facilitate public auditing of certificates and logs. The root hash of
the MHT is signed by the log–server and is called signed tree hash (STH).
Moreover, the log server periodically appends newly acquired certificates to
the log and creates a new MHT with an updated STH. Through the STH,
log server is able to provide consistency and audit proofs for any certificate.
With the consistency proof, it is easy to verify that all certificates have been
consistently appended to the log. Further, the audit proof helps in verifying
that a particular certificate has been appended to the log [70].
A merkle consistency proof checks that two different versions of the logs are
consistent with each other, that is, the later version is append–only consistent
with the earlier version. In order to accomplish this, first, it is necessary to
verify that the old merkle tree hash is a subset of the new hash value. Then,
it is enough to verify that the new hash value is a concatenation of the old
hash value along with all the intermediate node hashes of the newly inserted
certificates. The proof is the set of minimum intermediate node hash values.
A merkle audit proof verifies the proof–of–presence of a specific certificate in
the log. In case, the proof–of–presence check for a certificate fails a TLS client
can reject the connection. A merkle proof is the missing node hashes required
to compute root hash with a given leaf hash value. A leaf or certificate exists
in the log if the root hash computed with the audit path matches with the
merkle tree hash value of the log [96].
Chapter 7
Bootstrapping IoT Device
This chapter describes our proposed IoT deployment model and the boot-
strap mechanism to bring up an IoT device and provision it with a digital
certificate.
7.1 IoT deployment model
Figure 7.1: Proposed Deployment Model for IoT devices.
Figure 7.1 demonstrates the IoT deployment model that we propose. IoT
deployment environment can be an enterprise, a manufacturing unit, trans-
portation, health care services etc,. The devices are connected to an IoT
gateway which connects the devices to the Internet. For simplicity of the
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model, we assume that the CA server, DNS server and the DHCPv6 server
are cloud–based.
7.2 Bootstrapping Procedure
In this section we will explain the proposed bootstrapping procedure for
an IoT device. Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3 demonstrate the bootstrapping
procedure step-by-step.
Figure 7.2: Message flow to demonstrate bootstrapping of IoT device.
The device sends a DHCPv6 request to the server after booting up. With
the DHCPv6 response the device obtains an IPv6 address along with the
implicit trust anchor for the CA server. After installing the trust anchor, the
device can request the DNSSL from the router. Moreover, the router peri-
odically advertises the DNSSL through RA. The device generates a unique
auto–generated DNS name and sends a DAD to the router to confirm the
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uniqueness of the name across the network. Thereafter, with NI query and
response the router registers the device name through a dynamic DNS update
with the DNS server.
Figure 7.3: Message flow to demonstrate bootstrapping of IoT device.
Subsequently, the device establishes a TLS connection with the EST server
through an out–of–band shared secret. The device and the EST server mu-
tually authenticate each other based on the pre–shared secret key. Further,
the device sends a private key generation request to the EST server. The
EST server generates, archives and responds back with device’s private key.
Lastly, the device sends a certificate signing request to the EST server with
the private key and auto–generated DNS name. After receiving and verifying
the request, the EST server issues a new certificate for the device.
Chapter 8
Implementation and evaluation
This chapter examines constrained application protocol (CoAP) which is an
application layer protocol intended for use in resource–constrained environ-
ments. Furthermore, we have demonstrated certificate enrollment procedure
with an EST web–server based on RESTful web services implemented with
portable resteasy library.
8.1 CoAP
Web APIs on Internet application depend fundamentally on Representational
State Transfer (REST) architecture of the Web. CoAP is a web transfer
protocol designed for realizing the REST architecture to use within con-
strained nodes and networks. Constrained nodes generally have 8-bit mi-
crocontrollers and constrained networks are build on 6LoWPANs. CoAP
supports machine-to-machine (M2M) applications deployed in IoT scenarios
such as home–automation, smart–grids, transportation, manufacturing, etc,.
CoAP is based on a request–response interaction model between application
end–points and supports service discovery, resource discovery employing web
based URIs and media types [104].
Figure 8.1 demonstrates the abstract layering of CoAP protocol. Below is a
list of features supported by CoAP [31, 67, 92]:
(a) CoAP is designed on REST based web architecture. Servers pro-
duce the available resources with a URL and CoAP clients can
access the resources using methods such as GET, POST, PUT
and DELETE.
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Figure 8.1: Abstract Layering in CoAP.
(b) CoAP is designed to be interoperable with HTTP. Since both pro-
tocols employ REST model, they can be mapped statelessly using
cross–protocol proxies. Hence, CoAP resources can be accessed
via HTTP and vice–versa.
(c) CoAP supports multiple payload formats including Extensible
Markup Language (XML), JavaScript Object Notation (JSON),
Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and other user–
defined data format.
(d) CoAP incorporates UDP binding and supports reliable unicast
and multicast communication.
(e) CoAP supports security binding with DTLS.
(f) CoAP employs asynchronous message exchanges based on request–
response model.
Generic implementation for CoAP based on RFC 7252 are available for mul-
tiple platforms. Some implementations are published under open–source li-
censes such as Apache 2.0 or MIT license. Implementation for constrained
devices are generally written in C. Erbium is a REST based engine and
CoAP implementation for Contiki operating system [5]. Libcoap can be
used for constrained devices running Contiki or LWIP. Further, libcoap has
been ported to TinyOS [12]. Tinydtls is an implementation of DTLS for
constrained devices [14]. Microcoap is a C implementation for arduino and
POSIX [6]. SMCP implementation offers CoAP stack for embedded environ-
ments and supports asynchronous request–response model [7].
Moreover, CoAP implementations for cloud servers, home gateways and
smart–phones have also been published under open–source licenses. Cali-
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Figure 8.2: CoAP–HTTP system architecture.
fornium is java–based server side implementation of CoAP [2]. Node-coap is
a client and server CoAP library written in javascript and can be installed
in node.js [9]. CoAPthon is a CoAP library based on twisted framework and
written in python [11]. In addition, Copper extension for Firefox enables
access to CoAP resources from a web–browser [4]. Further, tools such as
crosscoap are also available to implement systems with CoAP. Crosscoap is
a CoAP server for translating CoAP requests to HTTP requests and HTTP
responses to CoAP to be sent over to the CoAP client [8].
Figure 8.2 demonstrates a CoAP–HTTP system to facilitate HTTP client
connections to CoAP resources and vice–versa.
8.2 Tools used
We provide a proof-of-concept implementation to demonstrate certificate en-
rollment procedure with an EST web–server. The web–server is based on
Java API for RESTful Web Services (JAX-RS) specification. JAX-RS pro-
vides support for creating web–services based on REST architecture [13].
For implementation, we have used resteasy portable library. Resteasy pro-
vides implementation for JAX-RS specification, can run in any servlet con-
tainer and supports tighter integration with JBoss application server [10].
Eclipse neon IDE was used for project development. Figure 8.3 shows the
basic project structure.
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Figure 8.3: Screenshot of project structure.
Figure 8.4: Screenshot–1 of operation GetCaCerts.
8.3 EST server prototype
The HTTPS enabled EST server listens on port 8443 for client requests. Curl
is used to simulate client–side URL transfer requests.
The EST server supports following operations :
(a) Get the root certificate used by the EST web–server.
(b) Get the CA certs from the server using GET cacerts.
(c) Certificate enrollment request to the EST web–server using GET
simpleenroll.
Figure 8.4 and Figure 8.5 demonstrate the operation to retrieve latest CA
certs or explicit trust anchors. Figure 8.4 shows client–side request with curl
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Figure 8.5: Screenshot–2 of operation GetCaCerts.
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and Figure 8.5 shows the response which is decoded to base64 and converted
to PEM format.
Chapter 9
Discussion
9.1 PKI challenges for IoT
PKI is the trusted solution for secure communication with current Internet
and can be further adopted to provide authentication, confidentiality and
integrity for IoT deployment scenarios. Moreover, management of digital
certificates by a CA is the core concept of PKI ecosystem. With this thesis
work, we have highlighted different certificate management protocols such as
SCEP, EST, CMP and CMC. Furthermore, we have motivated the use of EST
protocol for certificate management operations within IoT environment. EST
utilizes Cisco’s NGE by using ECC instead of RSA encryption. Besides, EST
employs Transport Layer Security (TLS) for secure transport of certificates
and messages. In addition, EST also supports CA server–side private key
generation for resource constrained devices and this can be an important
aspect as IoT devices may not have enough entropy source and power for
generation of a random private key.
Moreover, this thesis has focused on various challenges to adopt PKI solu-
tion for providing secure communication in IoT deployment scenario. We
have considered aspects such as naming of IoT devices, peer authentication,
private key generation, choice of cryptographic algorithm, scalable database
solution, life–span of digital certificates, managing high volume of issuance
and number of certificates per device to support large scale deployment of
IoT devices.
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9.2 Certificate Transparency with IoT PKI
Certificate Transparency aims at supporting early detection of forged cer-
tificates, rogue CAs and offers a better oversight to the current PKI model.
It advocates public scrutiny over CA operations by domain owners, CAs
and domain users through certificate logs, monitors and auditors. Certifi-
cate logs consist of cryptographic proofs which simplify the verification of
log consistency and certificate legitimacy. In order to verify the legitimacy
of a certificate, a client can request for an audit proof. A log containing 1
billion certificates will require the client to fetch 28 node hashes of MHT
which is approximately 30 KB data [96]. Furthermore, the efficacy of certifi-
cate transparency is vital for IoT deployment scenario. It is critical to secure
end–to–end device communication through digital certificates. A compro-
mised CA can generate fake digital certificates for IoT devices and introduce
a serious vulnerability in the PKI security solution. However, considering
the large scale deployment of IoT devices the CA certificate database can
be handling billions of digital certificates. In order to verify the legitimacy
of a digital certificate a resource constrained device will have to download
additional 30–35 KB data. This will increase the performance overhead for
the devices. We propose to oﬄoad this task to the IoT gateway for the
deployment model in Section 7.1.
9.3 Future work
The work in this thesis can be extended by setting up an end–to–end testbed
as proposed in Section 7.1 with cloud–based EST , DHCPv6 and DNS servers,
raspberry pi or arduino devices and an access point. The testbed will aid
in analyzing the feasibility of bootstrap mechanism proposed in Section 7.2.
Additionally, we will like to implement a large scale database solution for
the CA based on MHT to investigate performance, efficiency and scalability
with various certificate management operations and certificate transparency
as discussed in Section 4.3.2 and Section 6.2.
Chapter 10
Conclusion
This thesis has mainly focused on the deployment of an efficient, scalable,
trustworthy and flexible PKI solution for ensuring penetration–resistant device–
device authentication, device authorisation and inter–device communication
within an IoT deployment scenario. In addition, the work done provides
a comprehensive survey of the key aspects, challenges and the importance
of deploying a PKI security solution for IoT ecosystem. We have reviewed
various security attacks on different IoT deployment scenarios leading to dis-
abling of system operation, economic loss and privacy threat to sensitive user
data. Moreover, we have investigated the applicability of different certificate
management protocols such SCEP, EST, CMC and CMP to be employed
within a resource constrained environment. Subsequently, we have proposed
and motivated the adoption of EST as the suitable certificate management
protocol for IoT deployment scenario.
Additionally, we have proposed a PKI deployment model for IoT environment
and the bootstrap mechanism to bring up an IoT device and provision it with
X.509 digital certificate which ensures device authenticity, data confidential-
ity and integrity. Besides, the thesis has examined the need for naming and
identification of IoT devices which is a critical step in the bootstrap process.
We have incorporated DNS name auto–configuration scheme for IoT devices
as it assists in easy monitoring and controlling the devices remotely. Further-
more, we have investigated the feasibility of applying certificate transparency
over PKI in IoT deployments to introduce trustworthy CAs. Implementation
and evaluation work carried out in the thesis examines CoAP which is an
application layer protocol intended for use in resource–constrained environ-
ments. In addition, we have demonstrated certificate enrollment procedure
with an EST web–server based on RESTful web services implemented with
portable resteasy library.
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Appendix A
First appendix
A.1 Types of PKI model
A.1.1 A single CA or monopoly model
This model considers only one CA in the world for all certificate requesting
clients. All devices, applications or equipments have to be pre–configured
with the public key of this CA. figure demonstrates the monopoly model as
discussed above. All the certificates should be requested from the organiza-
tion running the CA. Even though it is the simplest model it has numerous
weak–points against adoption of this strategy :
(a) There is no such single organization which can be trusted globally
by all countries, companies, etc,.
(b) A single CA model is highly inconvenient, cumbersome to manage
and poses security concerns. It is expensive and sub–optimal for
a distant and unrelated organization to obtain digital certificate.
(c) In general, periodic changes in the keys is considered to be a good
security practice, for example, migrating to higher key size. In case
a CA’s private key is compromised within the single CA model,
all the clients have to re–configured with the new public key of
CA.
(d) Single CA is essentially a monopoly model and gives privilege
to only one organization for handling digital certificate life–cycle.
Within any monopoly model an organization can charge excessive
fees for granting certificates.
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Figure A.1: Single CA monopoly model.
Figure A.1 shows the monopoly model as discussed above.
A.1.2 A single CA with RA model
This model essentially follows single CA model and all the end–points have
to be configured with the public key of the single CA available. However,
there are multiple RA’s available which are trusted by the single CA. The
CA stores the list of all public key’s of RA’s under it. RA is responsible
for handling the certificate request from the end–points, authenticating or
verifying mapping between the name and key of the end–points, sign the
request and forward it to the CA. The CA creates the certificate for the
requesting end–point. With this model, the user is never interacting directly
with the CA. Revocation of key of any RA can be handled easily with this
model, however, this model still has other drawbacks of monopoly model.
Figure A.2 demonstrates the single CA with RA model as discussed above.
A.1.3 Oligarchy CA model
In oligarchy model multiple CAs exist. Hence, the end–points have to be
configured with a set of public keys. An end–point can choose and request
public keys from a list of CAs. This model enforces competition at CA level
and hence prevents excessive charging of fees for granting certificates. The
security of this model depends on all the configured CA public keys to be
secure. In case, any configured key is compromised an attacker can generate
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Figure A.2: Single CA with RA model.
forged certificates for end-points which will be trusted by all entities. So this
model has more attack points as compared to monopoly model.
Figure A.3 demonstrates the oligarchy model as discussed above.
A.1.4 Configured plus Delegated CA model
This model is essentially implemented in all the web–browsers and similar
to the models discussed above. In this model, the configured CA can sign
Figure A.3: Oligarchy model.
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Figure A.4: Configured plus delegated CA model.
certificates authorising other CAs to grant digital certificates for end–points.
The CAs whose keys are pre–configured with the end–points are called con-
figured CAs and the CAs who are authorized by configured CAs are called
delegated CAs. Certificates granted by either configured or delegated CAs
are completely trusted by end–points. Certificates granted by delegated CAs
include a certificate chain that link the CA to a configured CA. This model
allows end–points to obtain certificates from multiple points either a config-
ured or a delegated CA. This model is more secure as a user can obtain a
certificate from a CA which is located in close proximity. However, compro-
mise of any CA in the certificate chain pose similar threats to the security as
discussed in above models. In case a delegated CA is compromised, it may
go unnoticed for a significant period of time leaving ample opportunity for
an attacker to pose as a delegated CA and sign certificated for any of the
end–points. We discuss some such known attacks in Section 6.2.
Figure A.4 demonstrates the configured plus delegated CA model as discussed
above.
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Figure A.5: Anarchy CA model.
A.1.5 Anarchy model
This model has been extensively used in public domain Pretty Good Privacy
(PGP). The central idea is that the end–points start with a pre–configured
list of public keys. Moreover, the end–points learn new public keys by down-
loading them from a central database or by receiving them through an email.
With time, the end–points accumulate keys from other end–points and desig-
nate them as trusted. End–points are free to choose other trusted end–points.
End–points also distribute with their key a collection of certifying signatures
from other end–points. These eventually will lead to a decentralized fault-
tolerant web of trust for all public keys [115].
Figure A.5 demonstrates the anarchy model as discussed above.
Other PKI models that have been proposed include top–down, flexible bottom–
up, up–cross–down, etc., [89].
A.2 IoT economic impact
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Figure A.6: Potential economic impact of IoT by 2025 estimated to be 3.9
to 11.1 trillion dollars [78].
